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INTRODUCTION

Denial of Benefits (hereinafter “DOB”) clauses are not
a novelty in BITs. The NAFTA,1 CAFTA, 2 and the ECT3
(hereinafter “ECT”) all contain similar provisions. DOB’s
were favored by States who wished to limit the benefits of the
investment treaty to bona fide investors, in an effort to prevent
treaty shopping. DOBs are “often seen as a safeguard against
free riders,” 4 or as a method “to preserve in the relationship
between two states.” 5 Because the existence of an
international investment treaty regime is founded upon the
principle of pacta sunt servanda, 6 tribunals are dissuaded from
reading a DOB clause in an investment treaty that does not

North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1113.
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, art. 10.21.
3 Energy Charter Treaty, art. 17.
4 Loukas A. Mistelis & Crina Mihaela Baltag, Denial of Benefits and Article
17 of the Energy Charter Treaty, 113(4) PENN STATE L. R. 1321 (2009).
5 CRINA BALTAG, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: THE NOTION
OF INVESTOR, Wolters Kluwer (2012); See also RUDOLF DOLZER &
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 55 (Oxford University Press 2008) (“Under such a
clause the states reserve the right to deny the benefits of the treaty to a
company that does not have an economic connection to the state on whose
nationality it relies. The economic connection would consist in control by
nationals of the state of nationality or in substantial business activities in
that state”).
6 See generally Thomas Waelde, The “Umbrella” (or Sanctity of
Contract/Pacta Sunt Servanda) Clause in Investment Arbitration, British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, available at
https://www.biicl.org/files/946_thomas_walde_presentation.pdf (last
visited on Nov. 13, 2017).
1
2
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expressly include it. 7 Analytical approaches to the DOB
clause as under Art. 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty has
contributed to substantial jurisprudence in the development
of the clause, its purpose, and use.
Art. 17 of the ECT reads:
Each Contracting Party reserves the right
to deny the advantages of this Part to:
1. a legal entity if citizens or nationals
of a third state own or control such
entity and if that entity has no
substantial business activities in the
Area of the Contracting Party in
which it is organized; or
2. an Investment, if the denying
Contracting Party establishes that
such Investment is an Investment of
an Investor of a third state with or as
to which the denying Contracting
Party:
a. does not maintain a diplomatic
relationship; or
b. adopts or maintains measures
that:

7 See id; see also Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine ICSID Case No ARB/02/18,
Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 36 (Apr. 29, 2004) (“We regard the absence of
[a denial-of-benefits] provision as a deliberate choice of the Contracting
Parties. In our view, it is not for tribunals to impose limits on the scope of
BITs not found in the text, much less limits nowhere evident from the
negotiating history.”).
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prohibit transactions
with Investors of that
state; or
ii. would be violated or
circumvented if the
benefits of this Part
were
accorded
to
Investors of that state
or to their Investments.
i.

There are two key features to the wording of this text
that guide a reasonable interpretation should the clause be
invoked by a State. On the one hand, the clause specifies that
denying benefits of the treaty, is a right that is reserved to each
contracting State. On the other hand, the clause provides that
the denial of benefits may be to an investor or an investment.
With regard to the former, interpretation of the exercise of the
reserved right has been an issue of much contention under the
ECT and under other treaties. 8
Other treaties, use similar wording in their DOB
Clauses. The US-Ecuador BIT, 9 CAFTA, and NAFTA
“reserve” the right. This textual proposition poses many
vexing question of procedure—what is the meaning of a
“reserved” right? How should a State exercise a right that is
reserved? Does it mean that the right does not exist until it is
exercised? Tribunals have explored the extent and meaning

8 The

most prominent and debated decision is of the ECT tribunal in Plama
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005).
9 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of
Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, 1993 [US-Ecuador BIT].
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of the right itself, holding that a DOB clause must only be
applied prospectively.10 This paper explores the question of
whether the DOB clause should be applied retrospectively.11
It consists of four parts including this introduction. Part II
will appraise the reasoning used by tribunals so far, in
determining the effects of the DOB clause. Part III will
describe the three main arguments used by tribunals that
categorically reject a retrospective application of a DOB
clause. Part IV identify the flaws in the reasoning of the
proposition by analyzing the right under the DOB clause.
Part V will offer a conclusion by suggesting changes in the
drafting of DOB clauses for an effective invocation and denial
of benefits by a host state.
II.

TRIBUNALS IN FAVOR OF PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION

It is interesting to note that no tribunal, under any investment
treaty, has made a pronouncement of a “correct” time to

10 Supra note 8; see generally Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine,
SCC Case No. 080/2005, Final Award (Mar. 26, 2008) [ECT]; Empresa
Electrica del Ecuador v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9,
Award (June 2, 2009) [US-Ecuador BIT]; Ulysseas, Inc. v. Republic of
Ecuador, UNCITRAL Interim Award (Sept. 28, 2011) [US-Ecuador BIT];
Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14 [ECT]; Petrobart Limited v. The
Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003 [ECT]; Khan Resources Inc.,
Khan Resources B.V. and Cauc Holding Company Ltd. v. The
Government of Mongolia and Monaton Co., Ltd. PCA Case No. 2011-09
[ECT].
11 By questioning “retrospectivity” I mean, upon the “exercise” of the
clause, does the denial of benefits occur from the time of the investment
or from the time the clause is invoked?
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invoke the DOB clause. 12 The most prominent tribunal
holding that a denial of benefits clause is to be applied
prospectively, is the oft-criticized decision in Plama v.
Bulgaria. 13 The tribunal in Plama held that a DOB clause
could not have a retrospective effect because it is an issue
related to the merits of the parties dispute; 14 that only matters
relating to procedure could have a prospective application, if
any.
Aside from the question of jurisdiction and
admissibility of the question of denial of benefits, 15 perhaps
a less subjective ground is that of the concept of “half-notice.”
For example, the tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine 16 following the
Plama decision held that the presence of a DOB clause in the

See generally Lindsay Gastrell & Paul-Jean Le Cannu, Procedural
Requirements of ‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clauses in Investment Treaties: A Review
of Arbitral Decisions, 30(1) ICSID R. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
JOURNAL,+7897+(2015)+available+at
https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siu030 (last visited on Nov. 13,
2017).
13 Supra note 8; see generally id.
14 See generally the reasoning of the tribunal in Empresa Electrica del
Ecuador v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9, Award (June
2, 2009).
15 See e.g. Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Global Reflections on
International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution, ICC PUB. 601
(2005). See also Michael Waibel, Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper
No. 9/2014 (2014); Andrew Newcombe,
The Question of Admissibility in Investment Treaty Arbitration, KLUWER
ARB.+BLOG,+(Feb.+3,+2010),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2010/02/03/thequestion-of-admissibility-of-claims-in-investmenttreaty-arbitration.
16 Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005,
Final Award (Mar. 26, 2008).
12
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BIT is only a “half notice” and that “without further
reasonable notice of its exercise by the host state, its terms tell
the investor little; and for all practical purposes, something
more is needed.” 17
Treating the presence of the DOB clause in a BIT as a
“half notice” is furthered more by what the Plama tribunal
called an “active exercise.” In Khan Resources v. Mongolia, 18 the
tribunal first held that a question of denial of benefits does not
deny a litigant the benefit of arbitration under the treaty. The
Tribunal also held that the question of denial of benefits does
not go to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, but goes to the
admissibility instead.
At the outset, it must be stated that in
the Tribunal’s view, the Respondent’s
argument cannot affect the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction over Khan Netherlands’
claims
under
the
ECT.
The
introductory section of Article 17 of the
ECT specifies that it concerns the denial
of advantages of “this Part,” that is,
Part III of the Treaty, which is titled
“Investment
Promotion
and
Protection” and sets forth the

Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005) ¶ 157; See generally
Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation (PCA
Case No. AA 227), Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Nov.
30, 2009).
18 Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc Holding Company
Ltd. v. The Government of Mongolia, MonAtom LLC, UNCITRAL PCA
Case No. 2011-09, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 30, 2011).
17
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substantive protections that each
Contracting Party shall accord to
investors of other contracting parties.
Article 26 of the ECT, on which the
Claimants rely to establish the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, is found in Part
V, which is dedicated to “Dispute
Settlement.” Thus, on a reading of the
ordinary meaning of the terms of
Article 17, this provision can operate to
deny Khan Netherlands the benefit of
the substantive protections it would
otherwise be entitled to under the
Treaty, but not to deny it the advantage
of arbitrating its dispute with the
Respondents before this Tribunal. The
question of the application of Article 17
is therefore one for the merits, not
jurisdiction. 19
Therefore, the Khan Resources tribunal holds that an
invocation of Art. 17(1) does not automatically deny benefits
of the BIT to the party against whom the invocation is sought.
Instead, the tribunal interpreted the DOB clause with the
rules of interpretation from the Vienna Convention. 20 By
applying Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, the
tribunal found that the ordinary meaning of the word
“reserved” in the context of the DOB necessarily means that
it is only a “half notice” through the following reasoning.

19
20

Id. at 88, ¶ 411.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.
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Article 17(1) of the ECT provides that the Contracting
Party “reserves the right” to deny the benefits of Part III of
the ECT. The ordinary meaning of the verb “to reserve”
suggests that the right to deny the benefits of the Treaty is
being kept by the Contracting Party, to be exercised in the
future.510 Had Article 17 been intended to deny benefits
automatically, it could easily have been phrased to do so. A
formulation such as: “The advantages of Part III of the ECT
shall be denied to” would have made such meaning plain.
This leads the Tribunal to conclude that the Contracting
Party’s right to deny the benefits of Part III of the ECT must
be exercised actively. 21
The reasoning from Khan Resources is in line with the
jurisprudence on the ECT by past tribunals like Plama. 22 And
so the idea of half-notice directly influences the conclusion
that the reserved right should be actively exercised. 23 The
tribunal in Liman Caspian Oil 24 fully delineated the concept of
an “active exercise” by holding:
the Tribunal notes that there is no
disagreement between the Parties on
the point that Article 17 contains a

Supra note 18, at 90, ¶ 419.
Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005), ¶¶ 146-151.
23 See generally Carmen Nunez-Lagos, The Invocation of “denial of benefits
clauses”: when and how?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Feb. 17, 2014),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/02/17/theinvocatio
n-of-denial-of-benefits-clauses-when-and-how-2/ (last visited on Nov.
12, 2017); see also supra note 12.
24 Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of
Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14), Final Award.
21
22
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notification requirement to the effect
that a state must expressly invoke
Article 17(1) of the ECT to rely on the
rights under that provision. The
Tribunal agrees that this is the only
interpretation that can be drawn from
the wording that the host state
“reserves the right to deny the
advantages of this Part”. To reserve a
right, it has to be exercised in an explicit
way. 25
This necessarily means that an active exercise is crucial
for a contracting state to expect its interests to be protected
under the BIT. The Liman Caspian tribunal further emphasizes
that this active exercise requirement is a notification whose
effects are only prospective.
With regard to the question of whether
the right under Article 17(1) of the ECT
can only be exercised prospectively, the
Tribunal considers that the above
mentioned notification requirement –
on which the Parties agree – can only
lead to the conclusion that the
notification has prospective but no
retroactive effect. 26

25
26

Id. ¶ 254.
Id. ¶ 225.
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The tribunal reasons that a prospective effect is was
the intention of the parties to the BIT because the preamble to
the BIT wishes to promote long term co-operation between the
States; that such a long term cooperation is only possible if a
clause that denies benefits can be exercised prospectively.
Accepting the option of a retroactive
notification would not be compatible
with the object and purpose of the ECT,
which the Tribunal has to take into
account according to Article 31(1) of
the VCLT, and which the ECT, in its
Article 2, expressly identifies as “to
promote long-term co-operation in the
energy field”. Such long-term cooperation requires, and it also follows
from the principle of legal certainty,
that an investor must be able to rely on
the advantages under the ECT, as long
as the host state has not explicitly
invoked the right to deny such
advantages. Therefore, the Tribunal
finds that Article 17(1) of the ECT does
not have retroactive effect. 27

27

Id.
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PROPOSITION’S

The tribunals so far have arrived at conclusion that an
invocation of the DOB clause can only be prospective. 28 First,
since the presence of the clause in the BIT is only a “halfnotice”, it necessarily requires an active exercise in order for
a State to prevent an investor from acquiring benefits under
the BIT. This proposition has been delineated in the previous
section of this paper.
Second, that the interpretation of the clause in the
context of the scheme of the ECT and its preamble necessarily
renders the clause applicable only prospectively. This idea
was explored by the Liman tribunal which ultimately led the
tribunal to hold that the clause should only apply
prospectively.29 The reason for this determination is twofold. Primarily, there is a difference in the balance of powers
between an investor and a State. 30 Secondarily, the tribunals

See generally Aldo A. Badini, Practical Lessons for States and Investors From
the Pac Rim Arbitration, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (Marianne Roth & Michael Geistlinger eds.) (2013).
29 See supra note 24 at ¶¶ 224-25; See also Debora Pinto, Is the retrospective
exercise of the ‘denial of benefits’ clause contrary to the investor’s legitimate
expectations under the Energy Charter Treaty?, Maastrict University
Working Paper (March 2016) DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.1164.2481 (last
visited on Nov. 13, 2017).
30 See Arseni Matveev, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Evolving
Balance Between Investor Protection and State Sovereignty, 348-86 40 UNIV.
W. AUS. L. R. (2015). See also Henry Farrell, People are freaking out about the
Trans Pacific Partnership’s investor dispute settlement system. Why should you
care?,+THE+WASHINGTON+POST+(Mar.+26,+2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2015/03/26/people-arefreaking-out-about-the-trans-pacific28
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so far have stressed that since the right under the DOB clause
is reserved, it is necessary for its invocation to be “clear” and
“public.” 31 For instance, the Plama tribunal gives a list of
instances as to how a DOB clause can be exercised in a
manner that could possibly allow a retrospective application.
The Tribunal has also considered
whether the requirement for the right’s
exercise is inconsistent with the ECT’s
object and purpose. The exercise would
necessarily be associated with publicity
or other notice so as to become
reasonably available to investors and
their advisers. To this end, a general
declaration in a Contracting State’s
official gazette could suffice; or a
statutory provision in a Contracting
State’s investment or other laws; or
even an exchange of letters with a
particular investor or class of investors.
Given that in practice an investor must
distinguish between Contracting States
with different state practices, it is not
unreasonable
or
impractical
to
interpret Article 17(1) as requiring that
a Contracting State must exercise its
right before applying it to an investor

partnerships-investor-dispute-settlement-system-why-shouldyoucare/?utm_term=.39429452566b.
31 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case no.
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (Feb. 8, 2005) at 50, ¶ 157
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and be seen to have done so. By itself,
Article 17(1) ECT is at best only half a
notice; without further reasonable
notice of its exercise by the host state,
its terms tell the investor little; and for
all practical purposes, something more
is needed. 32
Third, an investor’s legitimate expectations under the
investment treaty may be violated if the denial of benefits
clause is allowed to be exercised retrospectively. This is
because, it is argued, that an investor will enjoy the benefits
of the BIT until it has been put to an official notice by a clear
expression by the host state. Otherwise, the investor could
become entrenched into the host state without any return on
its investment. This argument also goes back to the issue of
balance of power.
The covered investor enjoys the
advantages of Part III unless the host
state exercises its right under Article
17(1) ECT; and a putative covered
investor has legitimate expectations of
such advantages until that right’s
exercise. A putative investor therefore
requires reasonable notice before
making any investment in the host
state whether or not that host state has
exercised its right under Article 17(1)
ECT. At that stage, the putative

32

Id.
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investor can so plan its business affairs
to come within or without the criteria
there specified, as it chooses. It can also
plan not to make any investment at all
or to make it elsewhere. After an
investment is made in the host state,
the "hostage factor" is introduced; the
covered
investor’s
choices
are
accordingly more limited; and the
investor is correspondingly more
vulnerable to the host state’s exercise of
its right under Article 17(1) ECT. At
this time, therefore, the covered
investor needs at least the same
protection as it enjoyed as a putative
investor able to plan its investment.
The ECT’s express "purpose" under
Article 2 ECT is the establishment of "...
a legal framework in order to promote
long-term co-operation in the energy
field ... in accordance with the
objectives and principles of the
Charter" (emphasis supplied). It is not
easy to see how any retrospective effect
is consistent with this "long-term"
purpose. 33

33

Id. at 51, ¶ 161.
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This decision by the Plama tribunal has been cited by
other tribunals as well, strengthening the overall influence of
the argument over time. 34
IV.

FLAWS WITH PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION

The purpose of a DOB clause is to deter shell
companies from obtaining the benefit of an investment
treaty. It is a conscious decision that is made by contracting
states to an investment treaty. 35 The ability to enter into any
clause of choice by contracting parties to an investment treaty
is enshrined in the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 36 and is a
right that flows from the sovereignty of the state. 37 The
principles of pacta sunt servanda and state sovereignty
necessarily coexist in the sphere of international investment
law. This is precisely why a regular denial of benefits of an

See also Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Case No.
080/2005, Final Award (Mar. 26, 2008) [ECT]; Empresa Electrica del
Ecuador v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/9, Award (June
2, 2009) [USEcuador BIT]; Ulysseas, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador,
UNCITRAL Interim Award (Sept. 28, 2010) [US-Ecuador BIT]; Liman
Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14 [ECT]; Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz
Republic, SCC Case No. 126/2003 [ECT]; Khan Resources Inc., Khan
Resources B.V. and Cauc Holding Company Ltd. v. The Government of
Mongolia and Monaton Co., Ltd. PCA Case No. 2011-09 [ECT].
35 See generally M Sornarajah, Good Faith, Corporate Nationality, and Denial of
Benefits, in GOOD FAITH AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
(Andrew D Mitchell, M. Sornarajah, Tania Voon eds. 2015).
36 Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign
Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1550 (2008)
37 M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, at 88-143, 3d. (Cambridge University Press 2012).
34
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investment treaty to an investor and its investment that is
otherwise covered by the treaty, would violate the treaty.38
However, when a treaty is drafted with the goal that it
shall not entertain an investor or an investment that does not
conform to the requirements of the investment treaty through
a DOB clause, a tribunal must be conscious of the intent of
the contracting parties. First, the DOB clause was included in
treaties historically to safeguard contracting states against
“free riders.”39 These “free riders” were nationals of a third
state who cold reorganize their corporate structure in a
manner that would allow them to gain rights or interests in a
contracting state contrary to the intention of the contracting
states to the treaty.40 Historically, the DOB clause was
featured in the early treaties on Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation (“FCN”) where the clause was referred to as a
“reservation. . . directed primarily at the exercise by a
company of its ‘functional’ rather than its ‘civil’ capacity.”41
This would mean that a contracting state could deny the
benefits of a treaty without automatically denying nationality
or existence of the entity, or the ability of such entities to
redressal in courts. 42 But the ability of contracting states to
determine the basis upon which it shall protect investors and

Id.
Supra note 4, at 1302.
40 Herman Walker Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial
Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 373, 388 (1956).
41 Id.
38
39

42

Supra note 4, at 1303
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investments goes to the central idea of state sovereignty
itself. 43
For instance, academics note that a state can choose a
“latent protective clause which [it] may utilize if it wishes to
take the initiative of so doing” 44 because it is the ‘basic task’
of a BIT to determine whether an investor has sufficient links
to a treaty country. 45 The reason for this expedition is that
granting benefits of investment treaties to third countries or
to entities who “are primarily associated with those countries
and with which the denying country has no relationship,
would be ‘to abandon . . . [the] right to negotiate
corresponding privileges and obligations from those
countries.’ 46 ” 47 Academics also note that a DOB clause and
its presence in an international treaty is a “method to
counteract nationality planning” that entities undertake
when they attempt to invest in a country, purely to seek
protection under an investment treaty.48 Therefore, the BIT
will require that there exist a “bond” between the investor

See e.g. Ileana M. Porras, The Puzzling Relationship Between Trade and
Environment: NAFTA, Competitiveness and the Pursuit of Environmental
Welfare Objectives, 3 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 65 (1995).
44 Supra note 40.
45 Supra note 4, at 1303; See also J.W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact of Foreign Investment in
Developing Countries, 24 INT’L L. 655, 665 (1990) (stating that the
determination of which investors are covered by the treay reveals the
asymmetry in the relationship between the two countries.)
46 Id.
47 Supra note 4, at 1303.
43

RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 55 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).

48
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and the state whose nationality it claims to have, creating a
DOB clause.
Under such a clause the states reserve
the right to deny the benefits of the
treaty to a company that does not have
an economic connection to the state on
whose nationality it relies. The
economic connection would consist in
control by nationals of the state of
nationality or in substantial business
activities in that state.49
This goal is even evidenced in the early FCN’s 50 which
was modified to be introduced into modern day BITs. For
example, the following is the text from an FCN between the
U.S. and China:
each High Contracting Party reserves
the right to deny any of the rights and

Id.
The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, with Final Protocol
between the United States of America and Siam, signed on 13 November 1937,
provides in Article 1(8) that “neither High Contracting Party shall be
required by anything in this paragraph to grant any application for any
such right or privilege [exploration and exploitation of mineral resources]
if at any time such application is presented the grating of all similar
applications shall have been suspended or discontinued.”; See also
Thailand—U.S. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, signed on 29 May
1966, in 5 INT’L LEG. MATERIALS 876, 884 art. XII(1)(f) (1966), Treaty of
Amity and Economic Relations between the United States of America and the
Togolese Republic, signed on 8 February 1966.

49
50
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privileges accorded by this Treaty to
any corporation or association created
or organized under the laws and
regulations of the other High
Contracting Party which is directly or
indirectly owned or controlled,
through majority stock ownership or
otherwise, by nationals, corporations
or associations of any third country or
countries. 51
This stresses the purpose of DOB’s clause is a
determination by each contracting state to decide whether
treaty benefits should be granted to a national suspected of
indulging in ‘treaty shopping.’ 52 Soon after their presence in
FCNs, the DOB clause trickled down into model BIT’s as
well. 53 Therefore, the object and purpose of a DOB clause is

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and the Republic of China, signed on 4 November 1946 and entered
into force on 30 November 1948, in 43 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 27, 48 art.
XXVI (5) (1949).
52 P.B. Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 373, 379-80 (1985); For treaty shopping, see generally M.
Sornarajah, Portfolio Investments and the Definition of Investment 24 ICSID
REV. 516 (2009); M. Sornarajah, Evolution or revolution in international
investment arbitration? The descent into normlessness, in Evolution in
International Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Brown Chester and
Miles Kate eds. 2011); See also JORUN BAUMGARTNER, TREATY
SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Oxford
University Press, 2016).
53 See e.g. 1994 U.S. Model BIT, in CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN,
LAURENCE SHORE, & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL
51
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to prevent a treaty shopping investor from acquiring benefits
of the BIT because the contracting parties to the treaty
specifically intended such an effect.
Another important factor that tribunals have
overlooked in their logic to favor a prospective application is
the concept of the notice. Tribunals derive the conclusion that
the presence of the DOB clause in the BIT is a half notice, from
the text of the clause itself. For instance, the ECT states: “Each
Party reserves the right to deny benefits . . .” Supposedly, the
word reserves is a latent right. 54 But such an interpretation is
still contrary to the object and purpose of the DOB clause
itself. In its justification, the Plama tribunal distinguished
between the existence of a right and the actual exercise of the
right.
a Contracting Party has a right under
Article 17(1) ECT to deny a covered
investor the advantages under Part III;

INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 386-92
app. 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007). (The text read:
Each Party reserves the right to deny to a company of the
other Party the benefits of this
Treaty if nationals of a third country own or control the
company and
a) the denying Party does not maintain normal
economic relations with the third country; or
b) the company has no substantial business activities
in the territory of the Party under whose laws it is
constituted or organized.)
54 See supra note 34, where all the decisions specifically state that a
reserved right is so dormant that it requires an active exercise in a manner
that is clear to the investor against whom it is invoked.
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but it is not required to exercise that
right; and it may never do so. 55
Therefore, academics and tribunals alike, are in
agreement that the DOB clause under the ECT, is silent on the
method of invoking the right under the clause. 56 But this is
not necessarily tru. If in actuality, there is ambiguity in the
construction of the clause as to its exercise, the interpretation
can still be achieved through the application of the Vienna
Convention. 57 However, tribunals have incorrectly applied
the Vienna Convention by making the central focus of the
clause the investor.
For the Investor, the practical
difference between prospective and
retrospective effect is sharp. The
former accords with the good faith
interpretation of the relevant wording
of Article 17(1) in the light of the ECT’s
object and purpose, but the latter does
not. 58
The tribunal concluded that a prospective application
was appropriate also because a retrospective application

Supra note 8, ¶ 155.
Supra note 4, at 1319; see also id at ¶¶ 157-58. Cf H. Essig, Balancing
Investors; Interests and State Sovereignty: The ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction
Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, 5 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.
INTELLIGENCE, (April 2007) (recommending that States should enact a
law that is clear as to the exercise of the DOB clause)
57 Supra note 20.
58 Supra note 8, ¶ 164.
55
56
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would contradict the objects and purpose of the ECT by
discouraging investments since it violates the “legitimate
expectations” of an investor. 59 However, legitimate
expectations are determined by the information the investor
knew at the time of investment planning. 60 Other tribunals
have held time and time again that legitimate expectations of
an investor are “based on the conditions offered by the host
state at the time of the investment.”61 Therefore, it is
necessary for the basic expectations to exist at the time of the
investment in order for an investor to claim that protection
itself is part of the legitimate expectations by itself. 61

59 See also Michele Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law:
Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a controversial concept, 28 ICSID
REV. (2013).
60 See Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, At What Time Must
Legitimate Expectations Exist? TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. in A
LIBER AMICORUM: THOMAS WALDE – A LAW BEYOND
CONVENTIONAL THOUGHT (2012) 61 See Tecnicas Medioambientales
Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, Award, 29 May 2003, 43 I.L.M.
133, ¶ 130 (2004).
61 See Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets. L.P. v. Argentine
Republic, Award 22 May 2007 (concerning Enron’s indirect investment of
35.5% in Transporatadora Gas del Sur, one of the major Argentine
networks for the transportation and distribution of fas, Argentina had
offered by means of the Argentine Gas Law, the Gas Decree and the Basic
Rules of the License key tariff-related guarantees); See also B.G. Group Plc
v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, 24 December 2007 (where B.G.
Group had a direct and indirect investment in MetroGas, a natural gas
distribution company incorporated in Argentina); See also LG&E Energy
Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine
Republic, Decision on Liability, 21 ICSID REV. 2013 (2006); See also
National Grid v. Republic of Argentina, Award, 3 November 2008; See
supra, note 60, at 3.
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Surely, the concept of legitimate expectations is
subject to the kind of investment that is made as well.
Tribunals have stressed on the totality of an investment in
determining the kind of expectations an investor might have
had while making its investment plan and structure in the
host state.62 But the focal point to determine legitimate
expectation is the exact point in time when the decision to
invest was taken. 63 Several items may be classified as the
information available to an investor at the time it makes the
investment, including any particular assurances made to an
investor by the host state, specific contractual arrangements,
particular promises exchanged between the host state and the
investor, and the protections extended under the investment
treaty. 64 The protections guaranteed under an investment
treaty are a general expectation. 65 Therefore, when an
investor reads the text of the investment treaty under which
it seeks coverage and finds a DOB clause therein, the
legitimate expectation of the investor cannot be said to exist
without qualification. From an investment law perspective,
an investor has already been put on notice of a clause that
could potentially be invoked by the host state to protect its
interests. 66 Since there the key factor in the determination of

See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, a.s (“CSOB”). v. The Slovak
Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4).
63 Supra note 60, at 8; See also Sempra Energy International v. Argentine
Republic, Award, 28 September 2007; LG&E
64 See generally supra note 60.
65 Id.
62

See Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil SA. V. Republic of
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, 18 August 2008 (the
tribunal took into consideration, the expectations that Duke Energy had
66
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legitimate expectations, is the appreciation of cumulative
facts and circumstances that surround the investor, a blanket
statement as to the application of a DOB clause is therefore
untenable. 67 James Chalker correctly described the tendency
of the tribunal in Plama:
Plama constructed a legal standard
overly deferential to the investor and
interpreted the ECT's object and
purpose with an overemphasis on
investor
protection
to
dismiss
Bulgaria's jurisdictional objection. The
tribunal equated the object and
purpose of the ECT with a high degree
of investor protection. This protection
is not limited to basic issues of fairness
or nondiscrimination, but includes
predictability, namely the ability to rely
on Article 26 of the ECT to litigate a
claim. The tribunal cited two sources
for its interpretation of the ECT's object
and purpose: Article 2 of the Treaty and
an
essay
by
"distinguished
commentators", but it also suggested

at the time of the investment, and at a later time, based on the facts that
had occurred in the period prior to the investment made in Ecuador).
67 See also James Chalker, Making the Energy Charter Treaty Too Investor
Friendly: Plama Consortium Limited v. The Republic of Bulgaria, 5
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2005) available at www.transnationaldisputemanagement.com/article.asp?key=874;
See
generally
IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
(Armand de Mestral & Celine Levesque eds., 2013).
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that concern for investor protection
permeates the ECT. While the ECT is
certainly concerned with investment
promotion,
the
Plama
tribunal
misinterpreted International Court of
Justice and international arbitral
tribunal decisions and overstated the
amount
of
investor
protection
demanded by the Treaty's object and
purpose, and in so doing, failed to
engage in a meaningful inquiry into its
basis for jurisdiction. 68
It is with these flaws in mind that one must evaluate
the decision of the tribunal in Plama that has been faithfully
reproduced in other decisions of tribunals under the ECT. But
following a wrong consistently does not change the fact that
the core principle and argument is wrong. A tribunal looking
to make any sense of the DOB clause under the ECT must
therefore pay close attention to several aspects of the
investor, and of its investment before it attempts to interpret
a portion of the ECT.
First, the tribunal must determine the point at which
the investor can be said to have possessed legitimate
expectations of protection under the ECT. This means, the
tribunal must necessarily take into account whether the host
state has made particular promises, or entered into specific
covenants with that specific investor to induce an
investment. Second, the tribunal must then explore whether
the investor has indulged in legitimate treaty shopping. This

68

Id.
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does not mean to imply that treaty shopping is inherently
bad or detrimental to the interests of the host state. Treaty
shopping is good due diligence employed by an investor in
order to make legitimate investments that can be beneficial
to the host state. 69 Third, in inquiring whether the application
of the DOB should be prospective or retrospective, the
tribunal must necessarily rely upon the specific point in time
where the investor assumed legitimate expectations of
protection under the investment treaty. This point will guide
the tribunal to align itself with the intent of the contracting
parties to the BIT in the inclusion of the DOB clause. 70 Finally,
a tribunal must also ask whether the investor or the
investment that is being denied protection under the treaty is
the kind that the contracting parties intended to be covered
under the DOB clause. This means that the tribunal must
necessarily perform an analysis of the requirements under a
DOB before it determines whether the state can effectively
deny benefits.
V.

CONCLUSION

In light of the aforementioned fallacies in the logic
consistently used by tribunals to delegitimize a host state’s
prerogative in denying benefits of a BIT to an investor or an

See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 52.
The intent of the contracting parties to an international treaty is also part
of the travaux préparatoires of the treaty itself and must be given due
consideration in the interpretation of a treaty. See RICHARD GARDINER,
TREATY INTERPRETATION (Oxford, 2d. 2015); See also MARC J.
BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).

69
70
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investment, it may be necessary to re-structure the clause
itself. This is recommended especially in the light of the
misinterpretation of tribunals that wish to cite to the decision
in Plama to gain the ability to prevent a host state from
denying benefits.
Before proposing a re-drafted DOB clause, it is also
necessary to talk about the definition of an “investor” under
a BIT. The definition clauses of a treaty are the most
important tool used by a tribunal to decipher what
contracting parties to the treaty intended by their use of
common place words. These words include “asset,”
“finance” etc. If contracting parties to an investment treaty
wish to truly prevent treaty shopping in their jurisdictions
and effectively reduce the chances that an investor can
misuse the investment treaty, contracting parties must
necessarily re-think their strategy with the definitions clause.
Arguably, for the most part, the people who draft an
investment treaty are seldom lawyers, but are diplomats and
politicians who may not be fully aware of the legal
consequences of difference in terminology. Furthermore,
there is paucity of uniform legal language across the world.
What may be a simple, un-complicated word in a civil law
context, may be totally different from the legal context and
the interpretation of the word in a common law context.
Therefore, the lack of a uniform consensus on the usage of
terms may pose to be quite a challenge.
Investment treaties have, in the past changed the way
in which an investor is viewed. Some have a nationality test
for the determination of who a recognized investor under the
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treaty is, some others have a control test. 71 These tests are also
a means for states to determine which kind of investors it
wishes to recognize. 72 Therefore, the definition of an investor
must be aligned with the requirements of a DOB clause for
better execution by a host state. By aligning both definitions,
two purposes are achieved. First, there is no ambiguity
regarding which investor may be denied benefits because the
test is in-tune with the rest of investment treaty. Second, an
investor is put on notice of its ineligibility to acquire treaty
protections altogether because the investor would not
otherwise be covered under the treaty anyway.
Therefore, the following is the proposed revision of a
DOB clause in manner that circumvents the issue of
invocation giving notice to a putative investor and that of the
defense of legitimate expectations.
Art. X: Each Contracting Party hereby denies
benefits of the entirety of this investment treaty to:
1. a legal entity
a. if citizens or nationals of a third
state own or control such entity;
and
b. if that entity has no substantial
business activities in the Area of

71 For more on the types of tests and the influence of the ICSID
Convention, see Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Kingdom
of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (French
Original: 129 Journal du droit international 196 (2002)) (English
translation: 42 I.L.M 609 (2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004)).
72 See also Alex Grabowski, The Definition of Investment under the ICSID
Convention: A Defense of Salini, 15(1) CHI. J. INT’L L. (2014)
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the Contracting Party in which it
is organized; or
2. an Investment, if the denying
Contracting Party establishes that
such Investment is an Investment
of an Investor of a state that is not
a Contracting Party to this treaty,
or as to which the denying
Contracting Party:
a. does not maintain a diplomatic
relationship; or
b. adopts or maintains measures that:
i. prohibit transactions
with Investors of that
state; or
ii. would be violated or
circumvented if the
benefits of this Part
were
accorded
to
Investors of that state
or to their Investments.
3. For the purposes of clause 1 above,
ownership shall mean [ownership
by percentage of shares or stake
owned in the entity or otherwise in
sync with the definition of an
“investor” under the investment
treaty; and control shall mean
[type of control exercised by the
parent
company
over
the
subsidiary that is the investor, or
by the board of directors who are
nationals of a third state]
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This definition now clarifies that the right under a
DOB clause is no longer “reserved” and is more automatic
from the outset of the treaty, dismissing any insinuation that
the benefits of the treaty could possibly extend to any
“investor.” And finally, the third clause clarifies the
threshold that tribunals must now follow to determine what
kind of investors will not be protected under the treaty. The
second part of the definition also takes inspiration from the
many cases on piercing the corporate veil to enable tribunals
to see that the intent of the contracting states was to dissuade
treaty shopping and prevent shell companies from gaining
coverage under the treaty. 73

For piercing of the corporate veil in general, see generally Yaraslau
Kryvoi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in International Arbitration, 1 GLOB. BUS.
L. REV. 169-186 (2011); See also Yaraslau Kryvoi, Piercing the Corporate Veil
and Enforcement, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (May 3,+2010),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2010/05/03/piercing-thecorporate-veil-and-enforcement/.
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